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Science is serious play.
Leon Perkins, seventh-grade science teacher 
Ardmore Junior High School, Ardmore, 
Pennsylvania, 1956–1957
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Every year the U.S. National Science Foundation publishes a 
 comprehensive analysis of Science and Engineering Indicators. As long 
as I can remember, the chapter on public attitudes contrasts two key 
points. First, Americans have a highly favorable opinion of science 
and technology. Second, Americans lack an understanding of basic 
scientiﬁ c facts and concepts and are unfamiliar with the scientiﬁ c 
process. Astronomer Carl Sagan called the situation “a clear pre-
scription for disaster”: “We live in a society exquisitely dependent 
on science and technology, in which hardly anyone knows anything 
about science and technology” (1).
In this chapter, I present an overview of the scientiﬁ c process—
what I call everyday practice of science. All of us practicing science face 
common problems: what to do, when to do it, how to do it, who should 
pay for it, and—after the work is completed—what the ﬁ ndings 
mean. I hope to provide some general insights throughout this book 
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EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF SCIENCE
research. If one wants “to piece together an account of what scientists 
actually do,” wrote Nobel Laureate Sir Peter Medawar,
then the testimony of biologists should be heard with 
 specially close attention. Biologists work very close to the 
frontier between bewilderment and understanding. Biology 
is complex, messy and richly various, like real life. . . . It 
should therefore give us a specially direct and immediate 
insight into science in the making. (2)
I want to distinguish everyday practice from the idealized  linear 
model of research. According to the linear model, the path from 
hypothesis to discovery follows a direct line guided by objectivity 
and logic. Facts about the world are there waiting to be observed 
and collected. 7 e scientiﬁ c method is used to make discoveries. 
Researchers are dispassionate and objective.
Although representative of the way that we teach science, I 
believe the linear model corresponds to a mythical account—or at 
least a signiﬁ cant distortion—of everyday practice. Rather than 
linear, the path to discovery in everyday practice is ambiguous and 
convoluted with lots of dead ends. Success requires converting those 
dead ends into new, exciting starts. Real-life researchers may aim to 
be dispassionate and objective, but they work within the context of 
particular life interests and commitments.
The two conversations of science
Figure 1.1 diagrams everyday practice of science. I place the 
individual scientist in the center. She engages in two conversations, 
one with the world to be studied, and the other with other members 
of the research community. 7 e former conversation gives rise to 
the circle of discovery—learning new things. 7 e latter gives rise 
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to the circle of credibility—trying to convince others that the 
new ﬁ ndings are correct. 7 ese conversations are dialogs that 
proceed in an iterative manner. Of course, ﬁ gure 1.1 is highly 
 simpliﬁ ed because there are many conversations going on simulta-
neously. In addition, the researcher interacts only with a small part 
of the world, and the scientiﬁ c community is itself within the world. 
Nevertheless, making the artiﬁ cial distinctions in ﬁ gure 1.1 helps 
to emphasize that there are important diﬀ erences between these 
conversations. Interactions with the world typically are limited to 
making observations and carrying out experiments. Interactions 
within the research community depend largely on cooperative and 
competitive behavior.
Who is the individual scientist in ﬁ gure 1.1? To help answer 
that  question, I will introduce two imaginary researchers: Professor-
It-Could-Be-Anybody and Professor-Somebody-In-Particular. Prof-
essor Anybody is the idealized researcher who does science  according 
to the linear model. Professor Anybody is the scientist found in text-
books and research publications. Professor Particular, on the other 
Figure 1.1. Everyday Practice of Science
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hand, is the researcher engaged in everyday practice. Professor 
Particular  experiences science as an adventure, so much so that she 
might write an autobiographical essay called “How to Get Paid for 
Having Fun” (3). A lot of us doing science feel just that way.
Science textbooks and research publications 
exclude everyday practice
7 ere is no place for Professor Particular in the idealized structure of 
science. Sociologist Robert Merton described the norms of science 
as universalism, communism, disinterestedness, and organized skep-
ticism (4). Universalism means that scientiﬁ c claims are independent 
of the personal or social interests of researchers. Communism means 
that everyone owns scientiﬁ c knowledge. Disinterestedness means that 
the community suppresses any tendency of investigators to behave 
according to their own self-interests. Organized skepticism means that 
researchers suspend and replace personal beliefs with an attitude ori-
ented toward empirical and logical criteria. Merton’s norms describe 
perfectly the characteristics of Professor Anybody: independent of 
personal or social interests, knowledge owned by everyone, disinter-
ested, personal beliefs suspended.
It is Professor Anybody rather than Professor Particular who can 
be found in science textbooks. Textbooks usually present facts with-
out clarifying where and how they arise. Space limitations may make 
this omission necessary. 7 e consequence is that practice becomes 
invisible. 7 e more common the knowledge, the more anonymous 
will be its source. Years of research are compressed into one or sev-
eral sentences. At the same time, the adventure, excitement, and 
risks of real-life discovery disappear.
Research publications also mask the work of Professor Particular. 
To emphasize this point, I will describe some of the history of how 
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researchers discovered messenger RNA. To understand this  example, 
the following facts found in most modern biology textbooks will be 
useful:
All cells store their genetic information in double-• 
stranded molecules of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).
Diﬀ erent cell types transcribe diﬀ erent portions of the • 
sequence into speciﬁ c messenger RNAs (mRNAs).
7 ese mRNAs then are processed and translated to • 
make the proteins that determine in large part the 
specialized features of diﬀ erent cell types.
Taken together, these steps represent the classic molecu-• 
lar information pathway of modern molecular genetics:
DNA ⇒ mRNA ⇒ protein
When a biology textbook states that mRNA is the intermediate 
between DNA and protein, the textbook sometimes adds a foot-
note to a 1961 research paper published in the prestigious scientiﬁ c 
journal Nature. Evidence for the intermediary role of mRNA 
appeared ﬁ rst in the Nature paper (5). Research papers such as 
the publication in Nature provide the formal mechanism by which 
investigators report the details of their discovery claims to the 
scientiﬁ c community.
7 e 1961 Nature paper about mRNA is titled “An Unstable 
Intermediate Carrying Information from Genes to Ribosomes for 
Protein Synthesis.” 7 e paper begins by summarizing prevailing 
views and controversies on the subject. 7 en the paper suggests a 
new hypothesis to resolve the controversial issues: “A priori, three 
types of hypothesis may be considered to account for the known 
facts.” Experiments are proposed that could distinguish between 
the possibilities. Studies carried out are described. Conclusions 
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are drawn from the results. 7 e discovery claim is presented. 
Conceptually, the paper is arranged according to the sequence:
prevailing views ⇒ issues requiring further understanding ⇒ 
testable new hypothesis ⇒ experimental design ⇒ results ⇒ 
conﬁ rmation of one hypothesis and falsiﬁ cation of others
7 is sequence conforms to the linear model of science and gives 
rise to a paper whose plot will be none other than the  scientiﬁ c 
method. 7 is plot is not, however, the way things actually  happened. 
Rather, the scientiﬁ c method represents a formal structure imposed 
upon what actually happened. “Writing a paper” wrote Nobel 
Laureate François Jacob—one of the authors of the Nature paper—
“is to substitute order for the disorder and agitation that animate life 
in the laboratory. . . . To replace the real order of events and discov-
eries by what appears as the logical order, the one that should have 
been followed if the conclusions were known from the start” (6).
Stated otherwise, a research paper converts the process of 
 discovery into an announcement of the discovery. In a sense, the 
paper itself becomes the discovery claim (7). Rather than  discoverers, 
researchers become reporters of discoveries. 7 ey write “the (or these) 
data show” far more often than “our data show.” Even if  written in a 
personalized fashion, underlying every research report is the impli-
cation that that any scientist could have done the experiments and 
made the discovery.
Because the linear model of science typiﬁ es how scientists 
 communicate with each other when they make public their research, 
the misimpression easily can arise that science actually proceeds 
in this fashion. Autobiographical writings of researchers provide a 
 diﬀ erent perspective. In the case of the mRNA discovery, Jacob’s 
view of what actually happened can be found in his memoir 4 e Statue 
Within. Below are several quotes from Jacob’s book followed by brief 
comments to highlight important features of everyday practice.
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We were to do very long, very arduous experiments. . . . But 
nothing worked. We had tremendous technical problems. (6)
In everyday practice, experiments can be divided into three  classes: 
heuristic, from which we learn something new; demonstrative, 
which we publish—often repetition and reﬁ nement of heuristic 
experiments; and failure, which includes Jacob’s “nothing worked.” 
Not surprisingly, failed experiments represent the largest class. 
Failed experiments arise for many reasons, including methodological 
limitations, ﬂ awed design, and mistaken hypotheses. Experimental 
failures are part of the normal process of science. Even inconclu-
sive or uninterpretable results can still be extremely valuable if they 
 challenge the researcher’s previous assumptions and teach her what 
not to do the next time.
Full of energy and excitement, sure of the correctness of our 
hypothesis, we started our experiment over and over again. 
Modifying it slightly. Changing some technical detail. (6)
7 e objective and disinterested researcher envisioned by idealized 
science would never be “sure of the correctness” of an unproven 
hypotheses. Nevertheless, investigators’ intuitions based on their pre-
vious knowledge and experience sometimes lead them to  continue to 
believe in and pursue a hypothesis even when the hypothesis appears 
to be contradicted by the experimental results.
Eyes glued to the Geiger counter, our throats tight, we tracked 
each successive ﬁ gure as it came to take its place in exactly 
the order we had been expecting. And as the last sample was 
counted, a double shout of joy shook the basement at Caltech. 
Followed immediately by a wild double jig. (6)
7 e exhilarating experience of success! Solving a challenging  puzzle 
and being the ﬁ rst to know the answer can elicit a degree of excitement 
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and enthusiasm uncharacteristic of serious grown men and women at 
work. When my seventh-grade science teacher, Mr. Perkins, told me 
“science is serious play,” he was not exaggerating.
In summary, science comes in three diﬀ erent versions: (i) the 
facts—statements found in scientiﬁ c textbooks—with little if any 
explanation of their source; (ii) the linear model—found in research 
publications and used by researchers to establish the credibility 
of their work and to inﬂ uence the work of others; (iii) everyday 
practice—what really happened, a view rarely glimpsed by outsiders.
Science studies
In contrast to Merton’s description of the idealized structure of 
 science, philosopher 7 omas Kuhn focused on individuals and their 
practices. Kuhn’s book Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolutions had a great 
impact on development of the ﬁ eld called science studies. Rather than 
the idealized norms of science, the actual practices of individual 
 scientiﬁ c researchers and research teams became the focus of anthro-
pologists, historians, philosophers, and sociologists, who together 
developed the ﬁ eld of science studies (e.g., 8, 9).
Kuhn described paradigms in science as sets of beliefs and values 
shared by members of a scientiﬁ c community and as established and 
acceptable ways of problem solving (10). In addition, Kuhn  emphasized 
that, beyond these criteria shared by the community, scientiﬁ c judg-
ment depends on individual biography and personality (11). Writers 
from other backgrounds also have emphasized the importance of 
individual biography and personality on how a researcher practices 
science. Examples include the schemata of psychologist Jean Piaget 
(12), thought styles described by physician-immunologist Ludwik 
Fleck (13), scientist-philosopher Michael Polanyi’s tacit knowledge 
(14), and historian Gerald Holton’s thematic presuppositions (15). 
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According to this way of thinking, the  researcher’s understanding of 
things is not simply given. Rather, understanding requires interpre-
tation of  experience. Interpretation takes place within the framework 
of one’s life situation. Prior knowledge and interests inﬂ uence what 
the person experiences, what she thinks the experiences mean, and 
the subsequent actions that she takes. Unlike idealized science, 
everyday practice can accommodate the remark that author Steve 
Martin has Einstein make to Picasso in Martin’s play Picasso at 
the Lapin Agile: “What I just said is the fundamental end-all, ﬁ nal, 
not-subject- to-opinion absolute truth, depending on where you’re 
standing” (16).
After Structure of Scientiﬁ c Revolutions, science increasingly 
became of interest to study as an individual human activity char-
acterized by, among other things, social and political aims. Given 
its potential impact on the world, understanding these aims would 
seem to be essential. Consider, for instance, questions that have been 
raised by the feminist movement (17). Upper-middle-class, white 
males have dominated science in the past and continue to do so in 
the present. Does this lack of gender diversity among researchers 
in the scientiﬁ c workforce make a diﬀ erence in the practice of sci-
ence? If so, what diﬀ erence? When it comes to getting a job, being 
promoted, or getting an equal salary, much evidence suggests that 
absence of role models and mentors has acted as a diversity barrier in 
science and engineering ﬁ elds. Will lack of diversity also inﬂ uence 
how science is practiced or what science is practiced?
Objectivity and the research community
Some people believe that the eﬀ ect of cultural biases is limited to 
what is studied and not the conclusions reached by the research com-
munity. In his book 4 e Mismeasure of Man, evolutionary biologist 
grinnel.indb   11 10/17/2008   1:54:18 PM
( 12 )
EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF SCIENCE
Stephen Jay Gould argues otherwise. He uses historical examples 
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to describe 
how racist and sexist cultural attitudes inﬂ uenced not only research 
design but also interpretation. Science progresses, wrote Gould,
by hunch, vision, and intuition. Much of its change through 
time does not record a closer approach to absolute truth but 
the alteration of cultural contexts that inﬂ uence it so strongly. 
Facts are not pure and unsullied bits of information; culture 
also inﬂ uences what we see and how we see it. (18)
Gould’s use of the expression absolute truth reﬂ ects the important 
distinction between truth (small “t”) as we now understand things 
and Truth (capital “T”) that no further experience will change. I will 
emphasize frequently that everyday practice of science is after truth. 
Science always is a work in progress, which makes the process excit-
ing and challenging. Anyone who claims to know already the Truth 
of a matter must be depending on sources of information outside 
everyday practice of science.
An important example of cultural bias comes from the his-
tory of psychiatry. Until the early 1970s, homosexuality was viewed 
widely as an illness and was listed as such in the 1968 version of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-II) of 
the U.S. psychiatric community. 7 at the diagnostic classiﬁ cation 
was political rather than scientiﬁ c is shown by how the classiﬁ ca-
tion was changed. In 1973, the board of directors of the American 
Psychiatric Association voted that homosexuality was not an ill-
ness. Membership ratiﬁ ed that vote a few months later (19). With 
the link between homosexuality and psychopathology discredited, 
 homosexual couples increasingly have been accorded the same rights 
and respect as heterosexual couples. Now those who oppose homo-
sexuality, and many still do so, can less easily appeal to “scientiﬁ c/
medical facts” to support their objections.
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For some, admitting the human associations of science can 
 challenge the belief that science provides an objective description 
of reality. Especially at the fringe of the so-called postmodernist 
 movement, the argument has been put forth that scientiﬁ c facts are 
merely culture-dependent, normative beliefs. If there is truth to be 
learned, then scientiﬁ c inquiry deserves no privileged status. Truth-
for-the-individual likely is the best for which one may hope.
7 e postmodernists are wrong. Culture may inﬂ uence what we 
see and how we see it, but the dramatic impact of technology on 
the world shows that much of scientiﬁ c knowledge is more than 
mere belief. 7 roughout history, we humans have been attempting 
to overcome natural threats to our existence, such as famine and 
 disease. Beginning with the discovery and use of ﬁ re and the inven-
tion of primitive tools, controlling and changing the environment 
has been a central human project. 7 e ability of science to produce 
technologies with increasing impact on the world suggests that sci-
ence’s understanding of the physical mechanisms of the world has 
advanced.
So here is a paradox. How can practice of science situated within 
a particular cultural context give rise to knowledge that has uni-
versal validity? How does Professor Particular become Professor 
Anybody?
My way to begin to answer this question is by comparing scien-
tiﬁ c researchers with baseball umpires. According to tradition, there 
are three types of baseball umpires:
7 e ﬁ rst type says, “I call balls and strikes as they are.”
7 e second says, “I call them as I see them.”
7 e third says, “What I call them is what they become.”
What distinguishes these umpires is not the situations in which 
they ﬁ nd themselves, but rather the attitudes that they bring to their 
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work. Because of their diﬀ erent attitudes, they practice  umpiring 
diﬀ erently. 7 e ﬁ rst emphasizes Truth; the second, context; the 
third, power.
7 ose who have learned the idealist, linear view of  science 
frequently identify researchers with the ﬁ rst type of umpire. 
Postmodernists identify researchers with the third. Further descrip-
tion of discovery and credibility will clarify why the second type of 
umpire corresponds most closely to the way that scientists work.
In everyday practice, discovery begins in community. Community 
oﬀ ers continuity with the past and interconnectedness of the present. 
Each researcher or group of researchers initiates work in the context 
of prevailing experiences and beliefs—the starting point and justiﬁ ca-
tion for further action. We assume that this previous knowledge is 
incomplete or to some degree incorrect. 7 ere is little reward in sci-
ence for simply duplicating and conﬁ rming what others already have 
done. What we aim for is new-search rather than re-search.
What I am focusing on here is discovery at the frontier of knowl-
edge, a place where no one has been before. At the frontier, one 
encounters an ambiguous world demanding risky choices. What 
should be done ﬁ rst? What is the diﬀ erence between data and noise? 
How does one recognize something without knowing in advance how 
it looks? Of course, not all research occurs at the frontier. Clinical 
investigation involving humans should begin only in much more set-
tled territory after a great deal of preclinical work has been accom-
plished. 7 e ethics of research with humans demands that the work 
be as unambiguous as possible.
At the edge of knowledge, incomplete understanding can result in 
mistaken assumptions and errors in experimental design. At the same 
time, incomplete understanding sometimes permits observation of unex-
pected results. Nobel Laureate Max Delbrück called the latter aspect 
of research the principle of limited sloppiness (20). Here, sloppiness does 
not refer to technical error, although some important discoveries have 
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their origins in just that fashion. Rather, Delbrück meant sloppiness 
in the sense that our conceptual understanding of a system under 
investigation is frequently a little muddy. Consequently, experimental 
design sometimes tests unplanned questions, as well as those explicitly 
thought to be under consideration. Unexpected results can emerge and 
lead to important ﬁ ndings if the experimenter notices (21). We do more 
than we intend. 7 e underlying ambiguity of practice makes what we 
call luck or serendipity a frequent feature of discovery.
Because Professor Particular cannot avoid the possibility of error, 
including self-deception, her initial discoveries should be thought of 
as protoscience. For protoscience to become science, the researcher not 
only must be able to replicate her own work, but also must turn to the 
community to convince peers of the correctness of the new ﬁ ndings. 
Professor Particular overcomes her subjectivity through intersub-
jectivity. Intersubjectivity assumes reciprocity of perspectives—if you 
were standing where I am, then you would see (more or less) what 
I see. 7 e world is ours, not mine alone (22).
Reciprocity of perspectives makes possible the process of credi-
bility. Other researchers usually oﬀ er responses to discovery claims 
that can range from agreement to profound skepticism. 7 ey react 
to the speciﬁ cs of the research as well as to the relationship between 
new ideas and prevailing beliefs. Novel and unexpected discovery 
claims sometimes will be rejected or unappreciated by the community 
because the new thinking does not ﬁ t current understanding. 7 e his-
tory of Nobel Prize–winning research is replete with such examples.
Rather than accept rejection, to succeed in scientiﬁ c research 
often requires that researchers become advocates for their work. 
When the awards are given out, we frequently read:
Why were Professor Particular’s early studies ignored, 
neglected, and often denigrated? . . . 7 e powerful force of the 
longstanding dogma made it easy for the community to brush 
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aside Particular’s experiments and ideas and to view them 
as a curiosity with little or no relevance to the mainstream. 
Fortunately, Particular’s passionate belief in his data and his 
unshakeable self-conﬁ dence propelled him forward despite 
the criticisms of his colleagues. (paraphrased from 23)
Of course, becoming an advocate for one’s beliefs when everyone 
else thinks that you are mistaken is risky business. What appears to 
be novel often turns out to be experimental artifact. N-rays, polywa-
ter, and cold fusion bring to mind some of the most famous cases of 
erroneous research. 7 e only thing worse than being wrong in sci-
ence is being ignored. 7 e former frequently leads to the latter.
In the end, Professor Particular becomes Professor Anybody 
through the process of credibility. During this process, investigators 
shape and reshape their work to anticipate and overcome the criti-
cisms that they receive from the community (24). When (if) others 
eventually validate the new observations by using them successfully in 
their own research—often modifying them at the same time—then 
the new ﬁ ndings become more widely accepted. In short, credibility 
happens to discovery claims. Discovery claims become credible—are 
made credible or incredible—through their subsequent use (25).
Returning to the baseball umpire analogy, in everyday practice 
of science calling things as they are is reserved for the community 
rather than the individual. But even the community’s calling is ten-
tative. With discovery oriented toward completion and correction, 
the scientiﬁ c attitude defers Truth to the future and aims for cred-
ibility in the present. 7 e realism of science remains incipient and 
tightly linked to practice through last year’s discoveries. Last year’s 
discoveries become this year’s conceptual and technological instru-
ments of exploration. 7 us, realism of science emerges not through 
power, as supposed by the postmodernist critique, but by replacing 
individual subjectivity with communal intersubjectivity, philosopher 
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Annette Baier’s commons of the mind: “We reason together, challenge, 
revise, and complete each other’s reasoning and each other’s concep-
tions of reason” (26).
At the ideal limit, reciprocity of perspectives means that all 
scientists can share the same experiences. As experience becomes 
typical and commonplace, the unique individual disappears and the 
anonymous investigator (Professor Anybody) emerges. Scientiﬁ c 
knowledge aims to be correct for anyone, anywhere, anytime.
In summary, objectivity of science does not depend on the indi-
vidual. Rather, objectivity is a function of the community. Everyday 
practice of science is neither truth nor power, but rather balanced on 
a contextual ledge in between.
In practice, biography and personality never really disappear. 
Intersubjectivity can be achieved only partially. Because the  objectivity 
of science depends on the community rather than the individual, the 
inﬂ uence of personality and biography on the researcher’s scientiﬁ c 
judgments becomes an asset to science rather than an impediment. 
Diversity in how people think and work enhances scientiﬁ c explora-
tion of the world. Diversity of demographics—for example, gender, 
race, and economic status—enhances the possibility of a multicul-
tural approach (27). Without diversity, the community cannot really 
“complete each other’s reasoning and each other’s conceptions of 
reason.” 7 e judgments of a research community that is too homo-
geneous or isolated are just as much at risk as those of a community 
prevented by political interference from open exchange and dissent.
7 e foregoing discussion emphasizes the inherent ambiguity of 
everyday practice of science. Table 1.1 explicitly contrasts this ambi-
guity with the stages of the classic scientiﬁ c method. 7 e ambiguity 
evident in table 1.1 highlights Medawar’s comment that there is no 
such thing as the scientiﬁ c method, and that the idea of naive or 
innocent observation is philosophers’ make-believe (2). Inevitably, 
both sides of table 1.1 blend together.
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Table 1.1. 7 e Classic Scientiﬁ c Method vs. the Ambiguity 
of Everyday Practice 
The Classic View The Ambiguous View 
State the problem to be 
studied.
Choosing a problem commits one to 
investing time, energy, and money. 7 e 
wrong choices can place one’s life goals 
and career in science at risk.
Carry out experiments to 
study the problem and 
record the results.
7 e important results may not be noticed. 
What counts for data one day may appear 
to be experimental noise the next.
Conclude whether the 
observations conﬁ rm or 
falsify one’s ideas.
If the results don’t agree with expecta-
tions, it may be because the idea is wrong 
or because the method used to test the idea 
is ﬂ awed. Hence the adage: Don’t give up 
a good idea just because the data don’t ﬁ t.
Seek veriﬁ cation by other 
researchers of the ﬁ ndings 
and conclusions.
Discovery claims are often greeted with 
skepticism or disbelief, especially when they 
are very novel and unexpected. Rejection 
by other scientists is a common experience. 
To succeed, investigators frequently have to 
become advocates for their work.
Education without practice
We frequently hear the question, “What ails U.S. science and math-
ematics?” For more than a generation, an emphasis on the shortcom-
ings and need for enhanced science education in the United States 
has been recognized in every national report that addresses the sub-
ject. 7 e huge literature that has developed oﬀ ers many answers to 
the foregoing question but lacks consensus. “7 e candidates include 
teachers who don’t know the subject matter, lousy textbooks, a badly 
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designed curriculum, low expectations by educators and parents, 
an outmoded school calendar, and the debilitating eﬀ ects of pov-
erty and race” (28). In addition, maybe students are just “turned oﬀ .” 
7 ey think of science as a mere collection of facts rather than as 
high adventure. “Dry as dust,” commented Nobel Laureate Leon 
Lederman (29).
Shortly before his death in 1994, I heard Nobel Laureate Linus 
Pauling lecture at a science education workshop. Pauling began his 
personal reﬂ ection by holding up a contemporary college chemistry 
text. He suggested that the book was too thick—several inches too 
thick. In his view, textbooks had become collections of facts divorced 
from understanding.
Divorced from understanding reﬂ ects at least in part the omission 
of everyday practice from science education. 7 is criticism is nothing 
new. More than 50 years ago, Harvard University President James 
Conant pointed out the problem in Science and Common Sense:
7 e stumbling way in which even the ablest of the scien-
tists of every generation have had to ﬁ ght through thick-
ets of erroneous observations, misleading generalizations, 
inadequate formulations, and unconscious prejudice is rarely 
appreciated by those who obtain their scientiﬁ c knowledge 
from textbooks. (30)
Even the science fair, one of the most popular and valuable sci-
ence education experiences, distorts practice. 7 e science fair judge 
begins by asking, “Is the problem stated clearly and unambigu-
ously?” 7 e hypothesis always goes near the upper left-hand corner 
of the poster board describing the science project, and must come 
ﬁ rst—never last. When I encouraged one of my children to put the 
hypothesis at the lower right as her conclusion, she lost points. After 
that, she questioned whether I really understood science! Traditional 
science fairs reward success in research and clarity of presentation. 
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What kind of science fair rewards success in the playfulness of 
discovery, including learning what not to do the next time?
Why has everyday practice not become a more central focus for 
science education? Whatever the reasons, ignoring practice impedes 
the goals of science education. When he was executive director of the 
National Science Teachers Association, Bill Aldridge wrote that the 
framework for science education should be built around three fun-
damental questions: What do we mean? How do we know? Why do 
we believe? (31). 7 ose who do not understand the practice of science 
cannot, in the end, answer these questions.
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